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Ad Hoc wireless networks have greatly increased information sharing and
accessing amongst the general public, but these networks do not have any infrastructure
and have limited resources. Due to their infrastructureless characteristics and limited
resources these networks face two difficult challenges:
• Providing quality of service
• Securing these networks as they are vulnerable to attacks
Today, many efficient routing protocols exist for Ad Hoc wireless networks.
However, it is very difficult to measure the quality of service of security provided by
existing protocols. In [7] the author has proposed a finite state machine approach to
measure the quality of service or security in relation to another protocol. Although this is
not an absolute measure, it is a useful indicator of the quality of service or security
provided by one protocol in comparison with another protocol.
In this thesis we propose to extend this approach by modeling protocols as Petri
Nets. Petri nets provide several advantages over finite state machines. In particular, Petri
Nets can indicate the current state of the protocol as defined by the distribution of tokens
in the net. Secondly Petri Nets allow us to reason about the net and derive useful
properties of the system.
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In our proposed approach we look at four key issues:
 To define a measure for the matching of two nets. Here one net is protocol petri net
and the other one is the attack petri net. This is achieved by determining closest match
between the states and transitions of the two Petri nets such that the attacker’s goal is
reachable.
 To find similar markings in protocol petri net model and attack petri net. This will
ensure the existence of vulnerable states which will be of benefit to the attacker and
cause maximum damage to the user.
 To determine how much damage an attack can cause to the protocol. We analyze
what resources, i.e. data and actions, are exposed to the intruder, and the sensitivity of
the information compromised. Based on this analysis we assign the cost of damage to
the user.
 Once the damage is estimated, various protective measures are implemented to
protect the protocol from an attack by reducing or eliminating the number of exposed
vulnerable states and resources.
The proposed model is divided into three main phases.
 Modeling. The purpose of modeling is to be able to define petri net models for
network protocols and attacks and further identify their properties and reason about
them. Here we model the following:
• Petri net model of protocol
• Petri net model of attack
• Determine the reachability graph of the attack Petri net
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• Categorization of resources in protocol model. Each resource identified in
protocol and attack net is categorized into different abstract dimensions, which
define an attack surface.
• Pay off function assigns costs to the categories. The payoff function helps
determine the maximum matching of states in protocol net with states of attack
net.
 Damage Estimation: The objective of this phase is to find the states in the protocol
petri net that are of maximum benefit to the attacker.
• Matching of protocol and attack petri nets.
• Yields common states and resources. The most vulnerable states and resources in
protocol petri net are obtained.
• Determine the damage for the substructure using pay off function and categories.
Categories are determined by classifying the resources based on their properties.
Some resources are targets of attack while some are enablers that just enable an
attack whereas others are carriers that propagate the attack to the targeted
resource. A detailed description is given in chapter 4.
 Protection. The objective here is to protect the protocol against intrusions by defining
two protective measures:
• Changing the access rights of the vulnerable resources.
• Changing the order of availability of resources.
The rest of the thesis is outlined as follows:
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In chapter 2, we present a literature review of previous work done in area of
using both Petri nets and FSM to represent protocols. We also review the work done in
the field of measurement of security of protocols using colored petri net models. In
chapter 3, we provide a brief introduction to the ordinary petri nets and their analysis. In
chapter 4, we provide the details of the proposed model for modeling, damage estimation
and protection of the network protocol. We model petri nets for an ad hoc network
protocol along with the attack that can be mounted on this protocol. This chapter also
provides the various attacks possible on the physical layer, transport layer along with
suitable defense mechanisms identified. In chapter 5, we provide the details of the




This chapter provides an overview of the key concepts involved in measuring the
security of ad hoc network protocols using finite state machines as well as Petri nets. This
chapter illustrates the previous work undertaken and completed to understand the metric
of an attack surface. The concept- attack surface, attack dimensions are made use of in
subsequent chapters. The chapter provides a concise description of the previous work
attempted in the measuring the security of protocols using different methods.
2.1 Ad hoc Network Protocols
An ad hoc network is a collection of wireless mobile nodes dynamically forming
a temporary network without the use of any existing network infrastructure or centralized
administration. Their nodes have only limited bandwidth and limited battery power. Due
to the limited transmission range of wireless network interfaces, multiple network "hops"
may be needed for one node to exchange data with another across the network. In recent
years, a variety of new routing protocols targeted specifically at this environment have
been developed, but little performance information on each protocol and no realistic
performance comparison between them is available.
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Ad hoc network routing can be classified into proactive and reactive ones. The
former continuously makes routing decisions so that routes are immediately available
when packets need to be transmitted with no regard as to when and how frequently such
routes are desired. An example protocol is the Destination Sequence Distance Vector
(DSDV) protocol.
The reactive protocols determine routes on an on-demand basis; when a node has
packet to transmit, it queries the network for a route. Example protocols include the Ad
hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) and the Secure Ad hoc On-Demand Distance
Vector (SAODV) protocols.
2.2 Measurement of security of Protocols using Finite State Machines
Some work has been done on the performance comparison of ad hoc protocols
based on metrics such as routing overhead, packet delivery ratio, end-to-end delay, path
optimality, and throughput. Perkin et. al. [12] focused on only comparing the two on-
demand routing protocols which are AODV and DSR. In other research, like [2], Broch
et. al. extended the ns-2 simulator to model the behavior of the IEEE 802.11 wireless
LAN standard and the wireless transmission channel. They used their ns-2 extension to
compare the packet delivery ratio, routing overhead and path optimality of DSDV,
TORA, AODV and DSR.
Our work for objective-II of matching the two petri nets based on resource
availability and access rights is an extension to the theoretical work on defining security
of Ad-Hoc network protocols and QoS Surfaces. The authors in [4] have theoretically
defined a metric to determine whether one routing protocol of Ad Hoc network is
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relatively more secure than another. They have counted the network’s attack
opportunities and used this count as an indication of the network’s attackability
(likelihood that it will be successfully attacked). The network’s attack surface is
described along four abstract dimensions: attack targets, attack triggers, attack carriers,
and access rights. Intuitively, the more exposed the attack surface, the more likely the
network could be successfully attacked, and hence the more insecure it is. Thus, one way
to improve network security is to reduce its attack surface. Based on the metric suggested
in [14] we propose to design a solution such that given a network protocol, it
automatically determines how secure the protocol is and how much QoS it provides.
According to the existing research in [7] the wanderer protocol is a simple
protocol that enables us to deploy the idea of an attack surface on ad hoc networks. Each
node maintains a list of neighbors available and not the whole network topology.
Although packets are broadcast, one neighbor is chosen from the list as the receiver and
only that node retransmits the received packet. A random choice of a node is made from
the list of neighbor nodes to be designated as the receiver. This random choice is
governed by the random function which is usually application-oriented.
A node may receive the same packet many times; each node keeps track of the
number of times it has forwarded a particular packet. A number, called the duplicate-
forwarding parameter, determines the number of times a packet can be forwarded by a
node. This duplicate forwarding parameter is set by the system design specifications. The
intrinsic working details of the wanderer protocol are represented as a state transition
diagram of the protocol.
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Figure 1: State Transition Diagram for Wanderer Protocol in [7].
State A represents the initial state of the network. No transmissions take place in this
state. The network just waits for some events to take place so that transmission of data
packets is necessary to report the events. At stage B, the request message from the base
station is received by the leaf node. This stage also corresponds to the necessity of leaf
nodes having to transmit data packets to report the occurrence of events to the base
station. At Stage C a leaf node has the required information for transmission. The
information to be transmitted will be suitably wrapped into data packets in the following
stages, which will be interpreted by the base station as the occurrence of certain events.
Stage D corresponds to the availability of the neighbor list in the leaf node. A neighbor
list is required so that the ‘receiver’ can be chosen to be the next node in the routing path.
E: This stage is responsible for packing the information requested into packets. These
packets can be interpreted by the base station to correspond to various scenarios and
10
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The receiver is determined using the random function from the neighbor list. The
policy used in the wanderer protocol is (Source ID + Receiver ID + Packet). At stage G
the ID of the source leaf node, ID of the receiver chosen using the random function are
attached to the packet so that only the receiver can transmit the packets to its neighbors.
At stage H, the packet is transmitted to all the neighbor nodes present in the neighbor list.
At next stage, I, the source node ID is stripped from the packet so that the receiver for the
next stage of transmission will not be the source node. The receiver has the packet ready
for further transmission. All the IDs which were initially packed with the data packet are
stripped off at stage J. Thus the packet is ready for transmission to the next node on the
routing path with- (Source ID +Intermediate ID+ new Receiver ID + Packet).
K is the final stage of the routing protocol, where the required packet has been received at
the base station. After the packet has been received at the base station, the network enters
the initial state A.
2.3 Measurement of security of Protocols using Petri-Nets
There has been some research done in comparing the performance of Ad-Hoc
network protocols under varying network scenarios. Xiong et al. [12] proposed a
topology approximation (TA) mechanism to address the problem of mobility and perform
simulation of AODV routing protocol based on Petri nets. In [12] a stochastic Petri net
based approach to model and analyze ad hoc network is suggested. Zhang and Zhou [3]
present a SPN model of ad hoc networks and analyze its performance as a function of the
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successful delivery ratio. In [13] an analysis of performance of TCP over MANET is
done using fuzzy timing high level Petri nets.
Others have used colored Petri nets in the development of protocols for Ad hoc
networking. In a joint research project [13] between the Centre for Pervasive Computing
and Ericsson Telebit A/S, formal description techniques in the form of Colored Petri nets
(CP-nets or CPNs) have been used in the development of protocols for ad-hoc
networking based on Internet Protocol v6 (IPv6) . CPN model specifying Edge Router
Discovery Protocol (ERDP) has been developed and integrated. The use of message
sequence charts and simulation have been used to analyze and investigate its behavior in
detail. State spaces have been used to verify important properties of the protocol.
In [10] Aly has generated a model using CP-Nets to show how it can be used to
analyze security protocols. It is based on generating an explicit CP-Nets specification for
the protocol and identifying insecure states that may or may not occur and performing a
backward state analysis to test if each insecure state is reachable or not.
Summary
The approach of representing protocols in petri net form and creating an attack
surface to determine features of a protocol can be extended further. This approach can be
verified to provide a feasible solution to detect vulnerabilities in a system, and hence




In this section, we give a brief introduction to ordinary Petri net theory through
some standard definitions and examples from [9].
A Petri net is a graphical and mathematical modeling tool and provide a
framework for modeling and analyzing both the performance and the functionality of
distributed and concurrent systems. It consists of places, transitions, and arcs that
connect them. Input arcs connect places with transitions, while output arcs start at a
transition and end at a place. There are other types of arcs, e.g. inhibitor arcs, which we
will use in our protection model. An inhibitor arc from place p to transition t disables t in
any marking where p is not empty. Graphically, an inhibitor arc connects a place to a
transition and is drawn with a small circle instead of an arrowhead. Since, one use of
inhibitor arcs is to model limited resources; we use them in our protection model to limit
the number of resources available to the attacker. Places can contain tokens; the current
state of the modeled system (the marking) is given by the number (and type if the tokens
are distinguishable) of tokens in each place. Transitions are active components. They
model activities which can occur (the transition fires), thus changing the state of the
system (the marking of the Petri net). Transitions are only allowed to fire if they are
enabled, which means that all the preconditions for the activity must be fulfilled (there
are enough tokens available in the input places). When the transition fires, it removes
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tokens from its input places and adds some at all of its output places. The number of
tokens removed / added depends on the cardinality of each arc.
Figure 2: Example of a Petri Net
The net can be represented as a 5 tuple (P, T, F, Min, l) where:
- P is a set of places,
- T is a set of transitions, where P intersection T =∅,
- F is a ⊆ ((P × T) ∪ (T × P) is the flow relation, where T is ⊆ range (F),
- Min⊆ P is the initial marking,
- l is called a labeling function.
Definition 1: A marking m of a PN (Petri Net) is a function m: P→ N. It gives the
number of tokens contained in each place p∈P. A token can be represented by a dot. The
initial state of a system is defined by a net marking called the initial marking. Figure 3a
shows a PN with its initial marking:
M0 (Pl) = M0 (P2) =1, M0 (P3) = O.
The marking can be more briefly expressed as a column vector: M0 = (1 1 0)
T.
Definition 2: A transition t is enabled wrt a marking m iff: for all p∈P, m(p) ≥I (p, t).
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In figure 4a, only transition t1 is enabled, and t2 in figure 4b.
Definition 3 (execution rule) : Firing an enabled transition consists of removing I(p, t)
tokens from each input place p and adding O(p, t) tokens to each output place p. Figure 5
shows the marking of the PN after firing the enabled transition t1. The marking reached is
Ml = (0 0 1)
T; in general, ∀ p∈P, Ml(p) = M0 (p) + O(p, t) - I(p, t).
Let M be the marking reached from M0 by applying the firing sequence s. If y is the count
vector of s (i .e. y represents the number of times each transition has been fired in s), then
m can be expressed by the state equation M= M0 + Ay,
where A= O - I = [a(p, t)], a(p, t)=O(p, t) - I(p, t).
A is called the incidence matrix of the Petri net in example of figure 3, And s= t1 t2 t1,
i.e., y = (2 1) T, leads to the marking m=mo + Ay = (0 0 1) T.
Figure 3: Incidence Matrix of Petri net [8]
Figure 4: Marked Petri Net before firing transition t1 [8].
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Figure 5: Marked Petri Net after firing transition t1 [8].
Definition 4 (reachability set) : The reachability set R(m) for a PN with marking m is the
set of all markings of PN which can be reached from m by firing a finite number of
transitions of PN .
The reachability set of the PN in figure 3 is R(mo)=(1 10) T, (0 0 1) T ) .
Analysis of Petri Nets
The following are some of the properties and questions that have been studied in
the literature about Petri nets. Later we will use these properties to analyze the behavior
of the Petri net model for protocols and attacks.
1) A deadlock in a PN occurs when a marking is reached where no transitions in the net
can be fired from that point on.
2) A PN is live with respect to a marking m if, for any marking in R(m), it is possible to
fire any transition in the net. Liveness guarantees the absence of deadlocks.
3) A PN is reversible or proper with respect to a marking m if for every m'∈R(m),
m∈R(m'). Reversibility guarantees that the system modeled by the PN can re-initialize
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itself. This is very important for automatic error recovery. It is easy to show that the PN
in figure 3 is live and reversible. Therefore it is deadlock-free.
4) A PN is bounded with respect to a marking m if there exists a finite number k such that
for any marking in R(m) the number of tokens in each place of the PN under that marking
is less than k. When k=1, the PN is safe.
5) A PN is (structurally) conservative if, for any initial marking m 0, there exists a
weighting vector w>0 Є N, n=|P| and for all m∈R(mo), w T m=w T mo i.e., the sum of the
tokens weighted by w is constant. The weighting vector w is called a P-invariant or S-
invariant of the PN. It can be proved from the state equation that w is an P-invariant of a
PN iff w T A=O where A is the incidence matrix of the PN.
6) A PN is (structurally) consistent if, for any initial marking m, there exists a firing
sequence s, called a cyclic firing sequence with respect to m, such that m –s*m. The
count vector of a cyclic firing sequence of a PN is called a T-invariant of the net.
Similarly, from the state equation, a T-invariant x of a PN must satisfy equation: Ax=O
For the PN defined in figure 3, the P-invariants are (n 1 n2 n1 + n2) T, n 1, n2>0, n 1 n2#0.




Protocols consist of a number of independent concurrent protocol entities that
may proceed in many different ways depending on, for example, when packets are lost,
timers expire, and processes are scheduled. Protocol consists of resources which are
either system resources or data resources. A resource can be a hardware entity like
printer, user ID, data packet, password etc.
This makes design and specification of protocols a difficult task. In order to
address the problem of security of protocols, a number of approaches such as key
management techniques and cryptographic approaches to name a few have been proposed
to improve the security.
To improve the security of protocol, we propose a model that first determines the
vulnerability present in protocol. We propose a model to dynamically determine if the
protocol can be attacked and propose a protective approach for improving security. Our
model is divided into three phases namely: modeling, damage estimation, and protection.
A main motivation for the use of petri nets in representing protocols and attacks is
the possibility to formally state and decide certain desirable properties, such as liveness
(i.e., the system can never lock up) and boundedness (i.e., loosely, the system cannot
accumulate indefinitely large amounts of work). The major advantage of using Petri nets
is the short description and analysis of the systems consisting of a number of different
processes having a similar structure and behavior.
17
 Modeling. The purpose of modeling is to be able to define petri net models for
network protocols and attacks and further identify their properties and reason about
them. Here we model the following:
• Petri net model of protocol
• Petri net model of attack
• Determine the reachability graph of the attack Petri net
• Categorization of resources in protocol model. Each resource identified in
protocol and attack net is categorized into different abstract dimensions, which
define an attack surface.
• Pay off function assigns costs to the categories. The payoff function helps
determine the maximum matching of states in protocol net with states of attack
net.
 Damage Estimation: The objective of this phase is to find the states in protocol petri
net that are of maximum benefit to the attacker.
• Matching of protocol and attack petri nets.
• Yields common states and resources. The most vulnerable states and resources in
protocol petri net are obtained.
• Determine the damage for the substructure using pay off function and categories
 Protection. The objective here is to protect the protocol against intrusions by defining
two protective measures:
• Changing the access rights of the vulnerable resources.
• Changing the order of availability of resources.
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4.1 Modeling
4.1.1 Petri net model of protocol
Modeling of protocols in Petri net form has following advantages:
1. Is easy to use and understand
2. Is a powerful modeling and analysis tool
3. Can be automated
4. Shares common properties (boundedness, liveness, completeness, proper termination
and deadlock-freeness) with protocols.
5. Can be easily transformed into state transition diagrams.
The petri net model of any protocol can be represented as follows:
• Places: States of protocol are represented by places. A change in place means that
either a new resource is added to the mapping, a resource was deleted, or a
resource changes in value. We assume each place-transition is atomic. An
execution of a petri net is the alternating sequence of places and transitions
executions: P0 × T1→ P1 × T2 → ……. Pi-1 × Ti→ Pi….
• Transitions: activities or actions in protocol are represented by transitions.
• Tokens: tokens are the resources, i.e. processes and data that are available in the
network, for example, Message, User name, data, password etc.
Wanderer Protocol
The wanderer protocol has been chosen to illustrate the working of our model.
The wanderer protocol is a simple protocol that enables us to deploy the idea of petri net
based model to detect the protocol’s vulnerability towards an attack.
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Figure 6: Petri Net model of Wanderer Protocol.
• PWanderer = {Set of states in the protocol}
= {A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K}
• TWanderer = {Set of actions that take a resource from one state to another}
= {T1, T2, T3, T4, T5, T6, T7, T8, T9}
• Tokens: tokens represent the resources, i.e. processes and data of the protocol, i.e.
User name, password, data, message, sender ID, receiver ID.
Working details of the wanderer protocol as described as below:
States:
• A: This is the state which represents that a data is ready. No transmissions take place in
this state. The sensor network just waits for some events to take place so that
transmission of data is necessary to report the events.
• B: The leaf nodes are waiting in this state for a request message from a base station.
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• C: This state represents a base station. Upon receiving a message from the base station
the leaf node enters the next stage to transmit the requested information through
transition T2.
• D: This is the stage which represents that the request message from the base station has
been received by the leaf node.
• E: The information to be transmitted will be suitably wrapped into data packets in
transition T1 and data packets are available at stage E.
• F: The source node information, i.e. node ID is added to the packet to prevent the
looping of packet between two nodes.
• G: At this stage, the neighbor list is available in the leaf node. A neighbor list is
required so that the ‘receiver’ can be chosen to be the next node in the routing path.
• H: A random function is used to determine the receiver from the neighbor list. Care is
taken so that the sender is not again chosen to be the receiver else the packet may just
loop across the two nodes without traversing in the forward direction.
• I: Once the Receiver is determined, its Receiver ID is also retrieved and stored at this
place so that it can be attached to the data packet.
• J: The (Source ID +Data packet) is available at this place to be attached to the Receiver
ID.
• K: The ID of the receiver chosen using the random function is stored along with the
Source Id and Data packet. This ID is added to the packet so that only the receiver can
transmit the packets to its neighbors. This is the policy used in the wanderer protocol.
(Source ID + Receiver ID + Packet). The packet is transmitted to all the neighbor nodes
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present in the neighbor list. Each neighbor node receives the transmitted packet but
confirms its identity as the receiver before transmitting the packet again.
• L: The source node ID is stripped from the packet so that the receiver for the next stage
of transmission will not be the source node. The receiver node is taken from the packet
so that only the receiver node has the packet ready for the next stage of transmission.
• M: The receiver has the packet ready for further transmission. All the IDs which were
initially packed with the data packet are stripped off. Thus the packet is ready for
transmission to the next node on the routing path. The packet is now added with the
original source ID, the current node ID, the new Receiver node ID.
(Source ID +Intermediate ID+ new Receiver ID + Packet).
• N: This is the final stage of the routing protocol where in the sensor network, the
required packet has been received at the base station. After the packet has been received
at the base station the network enters the initial state C.
Transitions:
T1: The information to be sent is collected and wrapped into data packets.
T2: Upon receiving a message from the base station the leaf node enters the next stage to
transmit the requested information.
T3: The Source ID of the leaf node and data packet are attached together.
T4: Neighbor node list is created and updated.
T5: The Source ID and Data packet is made available at the next state.
T6: Using random function over the neighbor node list, a receiver is determined.
T7: Receiver ID is attacked to the Source ID and Data packet, so that only the receiver
can transmit the packets to its neighbors. This is the policy used in the wanderer protocol.
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(Source ID + Receiver ID + Packet).
T8: The data packet is transmitted to all the neighbors of the transmitting node.
T9: Check if the current node is the receiver node ID
T10: Attach the node’s ID as the current intermediate node ID
T11: If the destination is the base station then the sensor network reaches its final state
T12: Timeout makes the base station, request for information from the sensor node
T13: The information is ready for transmission
4.1.2 Petri net model of attack
Similarly, we model the attack as a petri net. An attack is modeled as a sequence
of executions of actions that ends in a state that satisfies the adversary’s goal. The petri
net model of any attack can be represented as follows:
• Places: states of attack are represented by places. A change in place means that
either a new resource is deleted, or a resource value is changed. We assume each
place-transition is atomic. An execution of a petri net is the alternating sequence
of places and transitions executions: P0 × T1→ P1 × T2 → ……. Pi-1 × Ti→ Pi….
• Transitions: activities or actions in attack are represented by transitions.
• Tokens: tokens are the resources, i.e. processes and data that the intruder aims to
attack or use for an attack, for example, unauthenticated message, User name,
unencrypted data and password etc.
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Sinkhole attacks
In a sinkhole attack, the adversary lures all traffic from a particular area to a
compromised node, creating a metaphorical sinkhole with the adversary at the center.
Sinkhole attacks can enable many other attacks (selective forwarding, for example).
In sinkhole attacks the compromised nodes are made to act as sink holes so that the data
packets are dropped or selectively forwarded to avoid suspicion. Over a period of time all
the nodes in the network can be compromised to bring down the whole network. The
compromised nodes are present as different nodes in the neighbor list thus affecting the
normal functioning of the random function. Resources required to launch sinkhole attack:
- Unencrypted Message sender ID– Attack looks for nodes that transmit data and have
unencrypted ID. If this ID is available and is unencrypted
- Unencrypted data – Attacks looks for a node that has unencrypted data.
- Message receiver – Node that receives the message.
Figure 7: Sinkhole Attack Petri net Model
• Psinkhole = {Set of states in the attack}
= {A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H}
24
• Tsinkhole = {Set of actions that take a resource from one state to another}
= {T1, T2, T3, T4, T5, T6, T7}
• Tokens: tokens represent the resources, i.e. processes and data of the protocol, i.e.
User name, password, data, message, sender ID, receiver ID.
States:
A – The initial state of the sensor network, packets have to be transmitted.
B – Source ID of the node that sends the data or information.
C – HELLO/ Sybil attack so compromised nodes are present to be available on the
neighbor list.
D – Neighbor node list is available for choosing the receiver, which may have
compromised nodes from the Sybil/HELLO attacks. The random function chooses the
compromised node.
E – The packet is transmitted to the receiver, a compromised node has been chosen as the
receiver.
F – Sinkholes thus created affect the normal functioning of the network.
G – The packet is transmitted to an uncompromised node that has been chosen as the
receiver.
H – The packet reaches the destination (base station).
Actions:
T1– The base station has requested information from the sensor nodes and data packet an
Source ID available.
T2 – The Source ID and Data packet is made available at the next state.
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T3– The neighbor list is created. The compromised receiver is chosen from the neighbor
list using the random function available at the node.
T4– Receiver ID is attached to the Source ID and Data packet, so that only the receiver
can transmit the packets to its neighbors. (Source ID + Receiver ID + Packet).
T5– There are intermediate transmissions between the nodes, before the packet reaches
the base station.
T6– Compromised nodes relay HELLO packets to indicate their false presence as
neighbors to the source node. There are intermediate transmissions between the nodes,
before the packet reaches the base station. The final transmission of the packet to the base
station takes place.
T7 – After transmission of the packet the sensor network enters the initial stage A.
4.1.3 Determine the reachability graph of attack Petri net
The reachability graph of a net helps identify the path from one state to the final
state. Determining the reachability graph of protocol petri net ensures that when matching
the two nets (namely protocol and attack net) we obtain the best possible match that will
be of maximum benefit to the attacker and cause maximum damage to the user.
4.1.4 Categorization of resources in protocol model
Each resource in a protocol and attack net is associated with a category. The
categorization of resources helps us identify interesting properties of the resources to
characterize their attackability.
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Following are the four categories we define for resources:
• Targets
These are the processes or data resources that are used by the adversary to gain
control modify and compromise in a system. A target is a distinguished process or data
resource in the network that plays a critical role in the attacker achieving his goal.
Example of data targets are sensitive data, password, data carried by messages.
• Enablers
These are the other processes or data resources that are used by the adversary to gain
control over the targets. We use the term enablers for any accessed process or data
resource that is used as a means of the attack but is not signed out to be a target. Message
sender, message receiver can be termed as enablers.
• Channels
An adversary gains control over the resources through communication channels.
A channel is a means of communicating information from a sender to a receiver.
Communication Messages are the means by which the attacker gains access to the targets
on system. Carriers deliver attack from one node to another in the network, for example,
message containing unencrypted password.
• Access rights
Control over processes or data resources is subject to constraints imposed by the
system’s set of access rights. These rights are associated with each user, process and data
resource. The more generous the access rights, the larger the probability of attack. We
also represent conditional access rights based on number of conditions and combinations
of data and processes.
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Access rights are associated with all resources. These access rights determine the
type of access available on a particular resource. Conceptually we model these rights as a
relation, suggestive of Lampson’s original access control matrix [6]:
Access ⊂ Principals × Res × Rights
Where Principals = Users ∪ Processes, Res = Processes ∪ Data.
When required, to represent conditional access rights, we can extend the above
relation with a fourth dimension Conditions for conditional access rights,
Access ⊂ Principals × Res × Rights × Conditions
Following table shows the common resources that can be identified as candidates for
attack. The table also shows the access rights and categories these resources fall into.
Access rights are represented by single letters as follows:
Read is represented by a ‘R’, Write is represented by a ‘W’ and Read/Write is
represented by ‘B’. Send is represented by ‘S’ and Receive is represented by a ‘R’.
Resources Representation Targets Enablers Carriers Access Rights
Message contains password M  Read ( R )
Message contains data D  Read /Write ( B )
Unencrypted User Password P  Write ( W )
Username U  Read ( R )
Authenticated Sender A  Send ( S )
Unauthenticated Sender S  Send ( S )
Unauthenticated Receiver T  Receive ( R )
Authenticated Receiver R  Receive (R )
Table 1. Resource categorization and representation
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Resource identification for wanderer protocol and Sinkhole attack:
All the resources that are potential targets of attack are identified in the wanderer
protocol. All these resources are then categorized based on the attacker’s goal. The access
rights for these resources are expressed as a Read, Write, Send, Receive or a Read/Write
operation. Similarly, we identify the resources that attacker is looking for to execute its
attack. Resource Categorization of Wanderer protocol and Sinkhole attack has been given
in the following tables:
Resources Representation Targets Enablers Carriers Access Rights
Message contains sensitive data D  Read /Write ( B )
Encrypted password P  Read ( R )
Node List N  Write ( R )
Unauthenticated Sender ID S  Send ( S )
Unauthenticated Receiver ID T  Receive ( R )
Table 2. Resource categorization and representation for Wanderer Protocol
Resources Representation Targets Enablers Carriers Access Rights
Message contains sensitive data D  Read /Write ( B )
Node List N  Write ( R )
Unauthenticated Sender ID S  Send ( S )
Unauthenticated Receiver ID T  Receive ( R )
Table 3. Resource categorization and representation for Sinkhole Attack
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4.1.5 Pay-off function assigns costs to the categories
A payoff function F: Category  [0, 1] assigns payoffs to each resource. Payoffs
represent the likelihoods of damage. A category with a high payoff indicates that
resources of that class are more likely to be attacked and can damage the system than
resources of an attack class with a lower payoff. Our approach for defining a payoff
function is to quantify the “damage” the adversary can effect if resources in a given
attack class are compromised, e.g., in terms of cost to repair the system. We assign a
payoff of ‘1’ to the resource that has the highest risk of causing damage and ‘0’ to the
resources that have lowest or no risk of a causing damage. The payoff is also defined for
access rights and sequences the resources follow in the attack Petri net. For example a
combination of unencrypted username and unencrypted password input at same time is
more unsafe than a username and encrypted password or just a username input at
different stages in protocol.
We define payoff to the three main factors that influence the vulnerability of a protocol.
These factors are Resources, Access rights and Sequence.
Resources:
If a resource exists in both the attack and protocol net then we assign a cost of 1 to this
match. This would guarantee that the resources needed to launch the attack are available
in the protocol net, further increasing the chances of an attack. Resource types could be
an unencrypted message, data or a password or it could be a username.
Access Rights:
Once we have matched the resources in both the attack and protocol net we
would like to look for their access rights. If these also match, again a payoff of 1 is
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assigned to the matching access rights, further guarantying a stronger possibility of




A protocol ‘P’ is vulnerable to an attack ‘A’ if there exists a set of common
resources and conditions in the protocol and attack petri net such that the attack can be
launched on the protocol.
Starting with the initial transition, all incoming states are explored for this
transition, then the states incoming to the next transition, and so on. To find all possible
states we use breadth-first search technique. If the graph is inherently bounded, its
reachability graph will always have a finite amount of states.
To explain this in detail let us consider a protocol petri net and an attack petri net.
In order to launch an attack the attack petri net requires specific transition to be fired with
some specific conditions and resources. The access rights of these resources are also
taken into consideration. If the protocol petri net satisfies all the necessary conditions like
resources and access rights that are necessary to launch an attack, then we can say that
protocol is vulnerable to the attack.
As shown in figure 8 the attack can be launched by firing transition T1. The firing
of transition T1 requires all the resources and conditions to be satisfied for state ‘A1’. The
petri net model of protocol here has place S1 that satisfies all the conditions and resources
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requirements for launching attack. Thus, we aim at finding the best possible matches in
both the protocol and attack petri net.
Figure 8. Finding a matching state in protocol to launch attack.
4.2.2 Matching of Two Petri Nets
We assume that the two petri nets are state minimized. This assumption also helps
to find the markings that will be of maximum benefit to the attacker and cause maximum
damage to the user.
4.2.2.1 Algorithm description
We propose an algorithm to find matching resources, sequence and access rights
between the attack petri net and protocol petri net. The algorithm works as follows:
In the attack net, the transition that initiates the attack is identified. All the states for the
given transition and transitions prior to this transition are identified. Identify all the
resource types required by each state and their respective access rights for each transition.
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For each resource identified in attack net, find similar matching resource type in
protocol net. Using the payoff function, assign the cost of damage to each of this resource
matching found in the protocol net. If there is a match found for a resource, find if the
resource’s access rights in the protocol net also match with that of the attack petri net. For
each state in protocol net, we look for a state with maximum damage cost for resources,
and access rights. Repeatedly search for all the states in protocol unless all identified
resources in attack net are searched for in all states of protocol petri net.
The solution to the matching would result into either of the following:
 None of the two: resource type and access rights match: There is then an almost
negligible possibility of an attack.
 If the protocol have same the type of resources available as that of an attack and if
the protocol states (representing resource types) have the same access rights, then
there is a higher chance of an attack .
4.2.2.2 Algorithm
Algorithm Protocol Damage Estimator
Input: Protocol and attack petri net namely P and A labeled with resource types and
access rights.
Output: States with maximum vulnerability identified along with their estimated damage
cost for resource type and access rights.
1. Initialize the protocol matrix P1ij and P2ij with resources and access rights for
resources of the protocol net respectively.
set P1ij = l1 (P) and set P2ij = l2 (P) ;
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where l1 and l2 are labeling functions for resources and access rights respectively.
1. Initialize the attack matrix A1ij and A2ij with resources and access rights for
resources of the protocol net respectively.
set A1ij = l1 (A) and set A2ij = l2 (A) ;
2. While Current_Transition < = Attack Transition;
Attack Transition is the transition that initiates the attack.
Initialize ja = 0; where ja is the total number of attack states.
for s=1…m where m is the total number of protocol states.
for jp=1…n where n is the total number of protocol resources.
If A1[current_transition][ja] ≠ 0;
If A1[current_transition][ja]=P1[s][jp];
Then increment cost_resource(s) by 1
Check if access rights also match,
If A2[current_transition][ja]=P2[s][jp];
Then increment cost_accessrights(s) by 1
Increment ja by 1;
Calculate the total cost in percentage using the formula:
cost_resource(s)′ = (cost_resource(s) /total_resources)* 100;
cost_accessrights(s)′ = (cost_accessrights(s) /total_resources)* 100;
Subtract 1 from current_transition.
End.
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Let f1,.....fn be all the matches which are possible based on resources between the two
petri nets p1 and p2. The cost of damage f* is defined by:
Cost(f*) = max {cost(f)}
f1,...fn
Similarly, the cost of damage based access rights will be a max{cost (f)} for f = 1 to n.
This cost is termed as the “Cost of damage to the user” or “Benefit to the attacker”.
4.2.3 Yields common states and damage cost for protocol
The tool for matching petri nets will yield a set of states that are most vulnerable to an
attack. Our tool for matching the two petri nets gives the total payoff value for protocol
petri net which is termed as the “Cost of damage to the user” or “Benefit to the attacker”.
This payoff value is the percentage of matching found for resources and access rights.
The higher the percentage value of resource or access rights for a state, the higher is the
probability of an attack being successful. If for any state, there is a 100% resource match
and 100% access rights match, then the attack can surely be launched on this protocol
through this state and the damage depends upon the category the resources belong to.
Analysis of this cost is done in the following section and some protective measures are
suggested to reduce the number of resources exposed to the attack.
The Wanderer protocol and Sinkhole attack petri nets were input to the damage
estimation tool and the following results were obtained from the matching of protocol
and attack petri nets. 100% resources matched and 80% access rights matched at
transition T3 for states E and D in the wanderer protocol net. This states that the sinkhole
attack can be easily launched on the wanderer protocol since all the resources that are
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potential targets of an attack are completely exposed to the sinkhole attack. In the
following section, we analyze the wanderer protocol to prevent it from being attacked.
4.3 Protection
If an intruder state is no longer reachable from any state of the protocol petri net,
we can state that the protocol is safe with respect to that particular attack.
The Network is unsafe if we obtain states in protocol net that are similar to the
attack net, and hold resources that are required to launch an attack. Using our model we
can obtain the states in protocol net and resources that match with the resources in the
attack net and thus obtain the damage cost. This will enable us to find out the minimal set
of measures (state, resources and access rights and sequence of availability) that must be
prevented to guarantee that the adversary cannot achieve his goal. The aim here is to
avoid all those measures that can lead to attacker’s goal.
To define the protective measures we will first define the attack surface. The
categories (Targets, enablers, carriers and access rights) all together comprises of an
attack surface of a protocol. This means that the more the resources from all the
categories, the larger is the attack surface and higher the chances of an attack on the
protocol. The protective measure is defined as an action that reduces the attack surface
and thus reduces the chances of protocol being attacked by the intruder.
Intuitively, if there are more resources in category Targets, the higher the chance
of an attack being successful. The more the enabler, the larger is the chance of an attack
or chance of an attack being successful, the more the carriers, and the larger is the chance
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of an attack being successful. But above all, more generous the access rights, higher are
the chances of an attack being successful.
4.3.1 Protection against the intrusion
There can be two different approaches to protect the protocol from an attack.
• We can control the constraints imposed by access rights on all resources.
• Eliminate the identified vulnerability
 Controlling constraints imposed by access rights on all resources
One approach to reduce the attack surface is to change the limit on accessing the
resources. Each resource has an access right associated with it. If the constraint on
accessing the resources is restricted to minimal access, the attacker will not get exactly
the same conditions as required to launch the attack and would fail to do so. For example,
if we have a resource as “unencrypted data” with access rights as “Read” in a state.
Assuming that for a specific attack, our tool finds that this state is the weakest state and
has high vulnerability to an attack, then changing the access rights on unencrypted data
from “Read” to “protected” can thus reduce the probability of attack through this state
and further fail the attacker’s goal to damage the protocol.
 Eliminate the identified vulnerability
Changing the amount of resources available at a particular transition will reduce the
availability of the identified vulnerability. The protocol petri net can be modified to allow
fewer resources to be available to the attack net which will reduce the attack surface and
thus reduce the probability of attack on the protocol. In order to achieve this some extra
states, transitions and inhibitor arcs are introduced into the petri net of the protocol such
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that the resources are never directly accessible to the attacker. The inhibitor arc is
represented as an arc with a ball head. The arc is always from a place p to a transition t.
The meaning is that if p has a token it will hinder t from firing, i.e., opposite to that of a
normal arc. This will also change the order in which the resources can be available to the
attacker. The attacker will thus fail to get all the resources at the same time.
Algorithm Protection Model
Input: Protocol Petri net P labeled with resource types and access rights for all states and
transitions. Assume Vt, Vs and Vt-1 as set consisting of transitions and states.
Output: Eliminate the identified vulnerability in protocol by reducing the order
of availability of resources in the protocol.
1. Identify the transitions that are vulnerable to an attack. Let these transitions be
represented as elements of set Vt. Determine the states that are input to these
identified vulnerable transitions and represent them as elements of set Vs. Assume
all transitions incoming to states in Vs as elements of set Vt-1.
2. Vt´ is set of transitions added later on to the protocol with some encryption
operation. A decryption operation is also required at transition to retrieve resource
values and further perform the protocol operation normally and securely.
3. If ∑ Vs =1 i.e. the total input states to the transition in Vt is 1,
Then change the access rights of resource types in that state.
Else If the number of states entering a transition is more that one i.e. ∑ Vs >1 then
introduce inhibitor arc from every state in Vs to the previous transition of another
state i.e. the transitions in set Vt-1. If there are n states entering into the transition
then total of n-1 inhibitor arcs are inserted.
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4. Once all inhibitor arcs are inserted, another transition is added to the state above
the identified vulnerable transition. Vt´ transition ensures that if two resources are
available at this stage they are in encrypted form. When all the resources are
received at the vulnerable transition in encrypted form, the original protocol
operation on that transition can be executed along with a decryption operation to
retrieve the resources in their original state.
5. Once all the inhibitor arcs are added, we have avoided the chance of availability
of resources at the same time. But there needs to be an encryption for each
resource.
6. Add a transition for each state with any encryption operation that restricts the
access to resource in this state. Assume these transitions as member of set Vt´.
7. Once all the resources from all incoming states are received in encrypted form
they can be decrypted together and the protocol operations can be performed
securely.
End.
Definition: Protection Algorithm: This algorithm ensures that the resources needed by
an attacker are never available at the same time.
The Following example illustrates the above algorithm and resource protection. In figure
9 consider a petri net such that resources A and B are available in state S1 and S2 and are
input to transition T3 at same time. Both A and B must be available at the same time to
enable the transition T3. Assume that transition T3 is some operation ‘x’. An intruder also
needs the two resources A and B at the same time to launch the attack. A protective
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measure to avoid the attack is to change the order of availability of resources A and B in
protocol net.
State S1 and S2 has resource A and B respectively. An inhibitor arc is added from both
states S1 and S2 to transition T1 and T2 respectively.
Adding this arc ensures that transition T1 will take place only when state S2 is empty( i.e.
no resources in S2) and T2 is enabled only when state S1 is empty(i.e. no resources in S1). 
An operation- hide(R), where R is the resource, encrypts the resources such that the
intruder cannot access it.
The final transition T3 of protocol is modified to include an extra step of unencrypting the
resources from hide operation, such that: unhide(hide(R)) = R, where R is a resource.
Transition T3 is defined as unhide() + operation ‘x’.
Definition: The original protocol functioning remains the same even after adding extra
states and transitions and inhibitor arcs.
Assume that hide() and unhide() does nothing. Then in figure 9b at transition T3 we have
hide( A) = A and hide( B)=B (since we assumed hide does nothing). This condition is
similar to the condition in figure 7a at transition T3, both A and B are available at same
time. Hence, the original property and working of protocol is retained irrespective of
adding inhibitor arc.
Assume that states S1 and S2 are empty at the initial stage. Since S1 is empty and resources
for enabling T2 are available, transition T2 is fired and now state S2 has resource B.
Transition T1 is not fired unless S2 is empty. So, T5 is fired and resource B goes to state S4.
Now, when resources for enabling transition T1 are available it can be fired, as S2 is also
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empty, once T1 is fired, resource A is available in S1 and further after transition T4 it is
available in S4. Even though both resources are available in states S4 and S5, they are
hidden or encrypted. In transition T3, these resources are unencrypted or operation unhide
is performed and normal operation of T3 is executed.
Figure 9. Protective Measures
Eliminate the identified vulnerability in Wanderer Protocol
We consider reducing the order of availability of resources in the wanderer
protocol to illustrate our protective measure. The following figure shows the wanderer
protocol with inhibitor arcs. Inserting the inhibitor arc guarantees that the resources are
not available at same time. Following is a detailed description of the working of protocol.
We use the second approach of changing the order of resource availability by adding
inhibitor arcs. The following figure shows how the protective measure can reduce the
wanderer protocol vulnerability towards a sinkhole attack. The hide operation at
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transition T1′ is the encryption operation that encrypts the data packet, unhide operation
at transition T2′ can be a decryption method to retrieve the data packet.
Hide: Upon receiving a message from the base station the leaf node enters the next stage
to transmit the requested information. The message obtained from the base station is
decrypted with the individual key already assigned in stage A.
Unhide: The packet is transmitted to all the neighbor nodes present in the neighbor list.
Each neighbor node receives the transmitted packet but confirms its identity as the
receiver before transmitting the packet again. The transmitted packet is decrypted using
some decryption mechanism.
When the protected protocol and attack was again input to the tool, the resources found
were 50% at one state and 50% at another state and this proves that the protective
measure reduced the attack surface to a greater extent. This shows that the protocol is
now more secure(compared to 100% and 80% respectively previously).
T1 is fired only when there is a resource in state A but not in sate D′. Similarly, T2 is
fired only when there are resources in state B and C but not in state E′. Thus, at any given
point both state E′ and D′ cannot have resources i.e. either of the two states is empty.
Assume that initially only state A has a resource available. Then transition T1 is fired
since state D′ is empty. Firing changes the state of resources from state A to state E′.
Now, let’s say that B and C each have a resource available. But in this marking transition
T2 cannot be fired because there is a resource in state E′ and the inhibitor arc will allow
firing of transition T2 only when state E′ is empty. Transition T2 ′ is enabled and the hide
operation is executed i.e. the encryption of resource is done and the resource changes its
state to E′′. Now, since state E′ is empty, T2 can be fired and the resource changes its state
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to D′ and further firing of transition T2 ′ changes its state to D′′. Thus, the resources (data
packet and Source Id) are never available at same time. They are available at same time
just before transition T3 but since they are encrypted, the intruder will fail to launch the
sinkhole attack.




A tool has been developed to determine the damage cost to the protocol with
respect to an attack. We evaluate our system by implementing test data which contains
both normal and malicious data. Normal data refers to the protocol petri net and
malicious data is the attack petri net. The data was run through our tool and the damage
cost estimates were found for the wanderer protocol.
The tool uses the above mentioned algorithm to find the matching states and give
damage cost estimation for resources and access rights that are probable candidates for
launching an attack. This tool has been implemented using object oriented programming,
C++. Following figure shows the System diagram for the tool.
















Input: Input to the tool is the protocol petri net and the attack petri net i.e. the total
number of states and resources these nets consist of and markings for each state that
represent the total number of resources required for each state. Each entry also represents
the access rights for that resource in that particular state. An example of our input
description is given by figure 12. Each row represents a state in the protocol net and each
column represents a resource. Hence, (R1, R2 … Rm) is m number of resources in a
protocol petri net and (S1, S2… Sn) are n number of states in the protocol petri net, where
m and n are the total number of resources and states in a petri net. Access rights are
represented by their symbolic representation (see table 2). Since, an access right is linked
to each resource; an entry ‘x’ in SiRj denotes that there exists a j
th resource in ith state with
access rights ‘x’.
A similar representation is given for the attack net. The symbolic representation
of all resources and their access rights can be derived from the table as shown below. A
table can be defined for each resource and access rights that provides a detailed
description of all available resources in a protocol and attack petri net.
Figure 12. Example input file: resource allocation for different states.
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Resources Representation Targets Enablers Carriers Access Rights
Message contains password M  Read ( R )
Message contains data D  Read /Write ( B )
Unencrypted User Password P  Write ( W )
Username U  Read ( R )
Table 4. Example table for resources and their Categorization.
Let us assume that transition T1 requires all resources incoming via state S1. From
figure 12, we see that attack requires resource R1 and R3 with access rights as Write (W)
for resource R1 and read (R) for resource R3. The algorithm would look for resources
R1 and R3 in protocol net. Once it finds these two resources it also checks for the access
rights. From the protocol and attack figure, we find that all resources and access rights of
attack net for state 1 matched with the protocol net; thus giving damage cost of 100% for




In this thesis we investigate the vulnerabilities present in protocols and calculate
the amount of damage that can arise if these vulnerabilities are exploited by a malicious
node. Our approach proves that protocol and attacks can be modeled as Petri net models
and the matching can be applied to these nets to identify the damage cost and suggest
protective measures. The resources that can be potential targets of an attack are identified
as; categories.
For the experimental validation of our proposed model, we have developed a tool
to correlate the protocol Petri net and the attack Petri net to identify the worst
vulnerability in the protocol and a payoff function was applied to matches found for
attack and protocol resources. This payoff indicated that closer the matching of the
resources and access rights between protocol and attack, the higher the chances of
successfully launching an attack.
Once the weak link in the protocol is identified, we propose approaches to reduce
or eliminate the identified vulnerability. Two protective measures are suggested to protect
the protocol and reduce the vulnerable states. The measures suggested are verified by
implementing an example protocol. The modified protocol is also modeled as a Petri net
and again run through our damage estimation tool.
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Future work related to our approach will involve identifying more categories for
damage estimation and matching the structures of two petri nets. This will include
identifying the vulnerabilities and classifying them efficiently across the different
dimensions. Further work on combining and synchronizing the best features of multiple
protocols to create an improved protocol would be another avenue for future work.
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